@article {3507, title = {Quantum One-Wayness of the Single-Round Sponge with Invertible Permutations}, year = {2024}, month = {3/7/2024}, abstract = {

Sponge hashing is a novel class of cryptographic hash algorithms which underlies the current international hash function standard SHA-3. In a nutshell, a sponge function takes as input a bit-stream of any length and processes it via a simple iterative procedure: it repeatedly feeds each block of the input into a so-called block function, and then produces a short digest which consists of a subset of the final output bits. While much is known about the post-quantum security of the sponge construction in the case when the block function is modeled as a random function or permutation, the case of invertible permutations, which more accurately models the construction underlying SHA-3, has so far remained a fundamental open problem.
In this work, we make new progress towards overcoming this barrier and show several results. First, we prove the \"double-sided zero-search\" conjecture proposed by Unruh (eprint\&$\#$39; 2021) and show that finding zero-pairs in a random 2n-bit permutation requires at least Ω(2n/2) many queries -- and this is tight due to Grover\&$\#$39;s algorithm. At the core of our proof lies a novel \"symmetrization argument\" which uses insights from the theory of Young subgroups. Second, we consider more general variants of the double-sided search problem and show similar query lower bounds for them. As an application, we prove the quantum one-wayness of the single-round sponge with invertible permutations in the quantum random oracle model.

}, url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.04740}, author = {Joseph Carolan and Alexander Poremba} } @article {3308, title = {On the Two-sided Permutation Inversion Problem}, year = {2023}, month = {6/23/2023}, abstract = {

In the permutation inversion problem, the task is to find the preimage of some challenge value, given oracle access to the permutation. This is a fundamental problem in query complexity, and appears in many contexts, particularly cryptography. In this work, we examine the setting in which the oracle allows for quantum queries to both the forward and the inverse direction of the permutation -- except that the challenge value cannot be submitted to the latter. Within that setting, we consider two options for the inversion algorithm: whether it can get quantum advice about the permutation, and whether it must produce the entire preimage (search) or only the first bit (decision). We prove several theorems connecting the hardness of the resulting variations of the inversion problem, and establish a number of lower bounds. Our results indicate that, perhaps surprisingly, the inversion problem does not become significantly easier when the adversary is granted oracle access to the inverse, provided it cannot query the challenge itself.

}, url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.13729}, author = {Gorjan Alagic and Chen Bai and Alexander Poremba and Kaiyan Shi} } @article {2626, title = {On Quantum Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks and Learning with Errors}, journal = {Cryptography}, volume = {4}, year = {2020}, month = {3/21/2020}, pages = {10}, abstract = {

Large-scale quantum computing poses a major threat to classical public-key cryptography. Recently, strong \“quantum access\” security models have shown that numerous symmetric-key cryptosystems are also vulnerable. In this paper, we consider classical encryption in a model that grants the adversary quantum oracle access to encryption and decryption, but where we restrict the latter to non-adaptive (i.e., pre-challenge) queries only. We formalize this model using appropriate notions of ciphertext indistinguishability and semantic security (which are equivalent by standard arguments) and call it QCCA1 in analogy to the classical CCA1 security model. We show that the standard pseudorandom function ( PRF )-based encryption schemes are QCCA1 -secure when instantiated with quantum-secure primitives. Our security proofs use a strong bound on quantum random-access codes with shared randomness. Revisiting plain IND\−CPA -secure Learning with Errors ( LWE ) encryption, we show that leaking only a single quantum decryption query (and no other leakage or queries of any kind) allows the adversary to recover the full secret key with constant success probability. Information-theoretically, full recovery of the key in the classical setting requires at least a linear number of decryption queries. Our results thus challenge the notion that LWE is unconditionally \“just as secure\” quantumly as it is classically. The algorithm at the core of our attack is a new variant of the well-known Bernstein\–Vazirani algorithm. Finally, we emphasize that our results should not be interpreted as a weakness of these cryptosystems in their stated security setting (i.e., post-quantum chosen-plaintext secrecy). Rather, our results mean that, if these cryptosystems are exposed to chosen-ciphertext attacks (e.g., as a result of deployment in an inappropriate real-world setting) then quantum attacks are even more devastating than classical ones.

}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4010010}, author = {Gorjan Alagic and Stacey Jeffery and Maris Ozols and Alexander Poremba} } @article {2219, title = {On non-adaptive quantum chosen-ciphertext attacks and Learning with Errors}, journal = {14th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography, TQC 2019, June 3-5, 2019, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA}, year = {2019}, pages = {1:1-1:23 }, abstract = {

Large-scale quantum computing is a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography. In strong \"quantum access\" security models, numerous symmetric-key cryptosystems are also vulnerable. We consider classical encryption in a model which grants the adversary quantum oracle access to encryption and decryption, but where the latter is restricted to non-adaptive (i.e., pre-challenge) queries only. We define this model formally using appropriate notions of ciphertext indistinguishability and semantic security (which are equivalent by standard arguments) and call it QCCA1 in analogy to the classical CCA1 security model. Using a bound on quantum random-access codes, we show that the standard PRF- and PRP-based encryption schemes are QCCA1-secure when instantiated with quantum-secure primitives. We then revisit standard IND-CPA-secure Learning with Errors (LWE) encryption and show that leaking just one quantum decryption query (and no other queries or leakage of any kind) allows the adversary to recover the full secret key with constant success probability. In the classical setting, by contrast, recovering the key uses a linear number of decryption queries, and this is optimal. The algorithm at the core of our attack is a (large-modulus version of) the well-known Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm. We emphasize that our results should *not* be interpreted as a weakness of these cryptosystems in their stated security setting (i.e., post-quantum chosen-plaintext secrecy). Rather, our results mean that, if these cryptosystems are exposed to chosen-ciphertext attacks (e.g., as a result of deployment in an inappropriate real-world setting) then quantum attacks are even more devastating than classical ones.\ 

}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2019.1}, url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.09655}, author = {Gorjan Alagic and Stacey Jeffery and Maris Ozols and Alexander Poremba} }