



@article {1590,
	title = {Designing Incentives for Peer-to-Peer Routing},
	journal = {Proc. INFOCOM},
	year = {2005},
	month = {2005/03/13},
	pages = {374-385},
	abstract = {In a peer-to-peer network, nodes are typically required
to route packets for each other. This leads to a problem
of {\textquotedblleft}free-loaders,{\textquotedblright} nodes that use the network but refuse to
route other nodes{\textquoteright} packets. In this paper we study ways of
designing incentives to discourage free-loading. We model the
interactions between nodes as a {\textquotedblleft}random matching game,{\textquotedblright} and
describe a simple reputation system that provides incentives for
good behavior. Under certain assumptions, we obtain a stable
subgame-perfect equilibrium. We use simulations to investigate
the robustness of this scheme in the presence of noise and
malicious nodes, and we examine some of the design trade-offs.
We also evaluate some possible adversarial strategies, and discuss
how our results might apply to real peer-to-peer systems.},
	url = {http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~vahdat/papers/infocom05.pdf},
	author = {Alberto Blanc and Yi-Kai Liu and Amin Vahda}
}
