



@article {2097,
	title = {Why Bohr was (Mostly) Right},
	year = {2017},
	month = {2017/11/05},
	abstract = {<p>After a discussion of the Frauchiger-Renner argument that no \&ldquo;singleworld\&rdquo; interpretation of quantum mechanics can be self-consistent, I propose a \&ldquo;Bohrian\&rdquo; alternative to many-worlds or QBism as the rational option.</p>},
	url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.01604},
	author = {Jeffrey Bub}
}
@article {1602,
	title = {Whose Information? Information About What?},
	journal = {Quantum [Un]Speakables II: 50 Years of Bell{\textquoteright}s Theorem},
	year = {2016},
	month = {2016/01/01},
	author = {Jeffrey Bub and Anton Zeilinger and Reinhold Bertlmann}
}
@article {1319,
	title = {Why the Tsirelson bound?},
	journal = {The Probable and the Improbable: The Meaning and Role of Probability in Physics},
	year = {2012},
	month = {2012/08/18},
	pages = {167-185},
	abstract = {  Wheeler{\textquoteright}s question {\textquoteright}why the quantum{\textquoteright} has two aspects: why is the world
quantum and not classical, and why is it quantum rather than superquantum,
i.e., why the Tsirelson bound for quantum correlations? I discuss a remarkable
answer to this question proposed by Pawlowski et al (2009), who provide an
information-theoretic derivation of the Tsirelson bound from a principle they
call {\textquoteright}information causality.{\textquoteright}
},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-21329-8_11},
	url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1208.3744v1},
	author = {Jeffrey Bub}
}
@article {1311,
	title = {Why the quantum?},
	year = {2004},
	month = {2004/02/20},
	abstract = {  This paper is a commentary on the foundational significance of the
Clifton-Bub-Halvorson theorem characterizing quantum theory in terms of three
information-theoretic constraints (Foundations of Physics 33, 1561-1591 (2003);
quant-ph/0211089). I argue that: (1) a quantum theory is best understood as a
theory about the possibilities and impossibilities of information transfer, as
opposed to a theory about the mechanics of nonclassical waves or particles, (2)
given the information-theoretic constraints, any mechanical theory of quantum
phenomena that includes an account of the measuring instruments that reveal
these phenomena must be empirically equivalent to a quantum theory, and (3)
assuming the information-theoretic constraints are in fact satisfied in our
world, no mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of
measurement interactions can be acceptable, and the appropriate aim of physics
at the fundamental level then becomes the representation and manipulation of
information.
},
	url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402149v1},
	author = {Jeffrey Bub}
}
