



01235nas a2200145   4500008004100000245005000041210004800091260001500139300001200154520081600166100001900982700001601001700001601017856005601033       2005                        eng d00aDesigning Incentives for Peer-to-Peer Routing0 aDesigning Incentives for PeertoPeer Routing  c2005/03/13  a374-3853 aIn a peer-to-peer network, nodes are typically required
to route packets for each other. This leads to a problem
of “free-loaders,” nodes that use the network but refuse to
route other nodes’ packets. In this paper we study ways of
designing incentives to discourage free-loading. We model the
interactions between nodes as a “random matching game,” and
describe a simple reputation system that provides incentives for
good behavior. Under certain assumptions, we obtain a stable
subgame-perfect equilibrium. We use simulations to investigate
the robustness of this scheme in the presence of noise and
malicious nodes, and we examine some of the design trade-offs.
We also evaluate some possible adversarial strategies, and discuss
how our results might apply to real peer-to-peer systems.1 aBlanc, Alberto1 aLiu, Yi-Kai1 aVahda, Amin  uhttp://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~vahdat/papers/infocom05.pdf