01795nas a2200157 4500008004100000245008800041210006900129260001400198520128700212100002501499700001701524700002201541700001901563700001801582856003701600 2020 eng d00aA note on blind contact tracing at scale with applications to the COVID-19 pandemic0 anote on blind contact tracing at scale with applications to the  c4/10/20203 a

The current COVID-19 pandemic highlights the utility of contact tracing, when combined with case isolation and social distancing, as an important tool for mitigating the spread of a disease [1]. Contact tracing provides a mechanism of identifying individuals with a high likelihood of previous exposure to a contagious disease, allowing additional precautions to be put in place to prevent continued transmission. Here we consider a cryptographic approach to contact tracing based on secure two-party computation (2PC). We begin by considering the problem of comparing a set of location histories held by two parties to determine whether they have come within some threshold distance while at the same time maintaining the privacy of the location histories. We propose a solution to this problem using pre-shared keys, adapted from an equality testing protocol due to Ishai et al [2]. We discuss how this protocol can be used to maintain privacy within practical contact tracing scenarios, including both app-based approaches and approaches which leverage location history held by telecoms and internet service providers. We examine the efficiency of this approach and show that existing infrastructure is sufficient to support anonymised contact tracing at a national level.

1 aFitzsimons, Jack, K.1 aMantri, Atul1 aPisarczyk, Robert1 aRainforth, Tom1 aZhao, Zhikuan uhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2004.0511602382nas a2200145 4500008004100000245007400041210006900115260001500184520192100199100001902120700002402139700001902163700001702182856003702199 2020 eng d00aSecure Quantum Two-Party Computation: Impossibility and Constructions0 aSecure Quantum TwoParty Computation Impossibility and Constructi c10/15/20203 a

Secure two-party computation considers the problem of two parties computing a joint function of their private inputs without revealing anything beyond the output of the computation. In this work, we take the first steps towards understanding the setting in which the two parties want to evaluate a joint quantum functionality while using only a classical channel between them. Our first result indicates that it is in general impossible to realize a two-party quantum functionality against malicious adversaries with black-box simulation, relying only on classical channels. The negative result stems from reducing the existence of a black-box simulator to an extractor for classical proof of quantum knowledge, which in turn leads to violation of the quantum no-cloning. Next, we introduce the notion of oblivious quantum function evaluation (OQFE). An OQFE is a two-party quantum cryptographic primitive with one fully classical party (Alice) whose input is (a classical description of a) quantum unitary, U, and a quantum party (Bob) whose input is a quantum state, ψ. In particular, Alice receives a classical output corresponding to the measurement of U(ψ) while Bob receives no output. In OQFE, Bob remains oblivious to Alice's input, while Alice learns nothing about ψ more than what can be learned from the output. We present two constructions, one secure against semi-honest parties and the other against malicious parties. Due to the no-go result mentioned above, we consider what is arguably the best possible notion obtainable in our model concerning malicious adversaries: one-sided simulation security. Our protocol relies on the assumption of injective homomorphic trapdoor OWFs, which in turn rely on the LWE problem. As a result, we put forward a first, simple and modular, construction of one-sided quantum two-party computation and quantum oblivious transfer over classical networks.

1 aCiamp, Michele1 aCojocaru, Alexandru1 aKashefi, Elham1 aMantri, Atul uhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2010.0792502441nas a2200181 4500008004100000245007300041210006900114260001300183520187800196100002702074700002402101700001902125700001902144700002202163700001702185700002002202856003702222 2020 eng d00aSecurity Limitations of Classical-Client Delegated Quantum Computing0 aSecurity Limitations of ClassicalClient Delegated Quantum Comput c7/3/20203 a

Secure delegated quantum computing allows a computationally weak client to outsource an arbitrary quantum computation to an untrusted quantum server in a privacy-preserving manner. One of the promising candidates to achieve classical delegation of quantum computation is classical-client remote state preparation (RSPCC), where a client remotely prepares a quantum state using a classical channel. However, the privacy loss incurred by employing RSPCC as a sub-module is unclear.
In this work, we investigate this question using the Constructive Cryptography framework by Maurer and Renner (ICS'11). We first identify the goal of RSPCC as the construction of ideal RSP resources from classical channels and then reveal the security limitations of using RSPCC. First, we uncover a fundamental relationship between constructing ideal RSP resources (from classical channels) and the task of cloning quantum states. Any classically constructed ideal RSP resource must leak to the server the full classical description (possibly in an encoded form) of the generated quantum state, even if we target computational security only. As a consequence, we find that the realization of common RSP resources, without weakening their guarantees drastically, is impossible due to the no-cloning theorem. Second, the above result does not rule out that a specific RSPCC protocol can replace the quantum channel at least in some contexts, such as the Universal Blind Quantum Computing (UBQC) protocol of Broadbent et al. (FOCS '09). However, we show that the resulting UBQC protocol cannot maintain its proven composable security as soon as RSPCC is used as a subroutine. Third, we show that replacing the quantum channel of the above UBQC protocol by the RSPCC protocol QFactory of Cojocaru et al. (Asiacrypt '19), preserves the weaker, game-based, security of UBQC.

1 aBadertscher, Christian1 aCojocaru, Alexandru1 aColisson, Léo1 aKashefi, Elham1 aLeichtle, Dominik1 aMantri, Atul1 aWallden, Petros uhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2007.01668