



00956nas a2200109   4500008004100000245002700041210002100068260003000089520067300119100001700792856003700809       2019                        eng d00a‘Two Dogmas’ Redux0 aTwo Dogmas Redux  bSpringer, Chamc7/14/20193 a<p>I revisit the paper &lsquo;Two dogmas about quantum mechanics,&rsquo; co-authored with Itamar Pitowsky, in which we outlined an information-theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics as an alternative to the Everett interpretation. Following the analysis by Frauchiger and Renner of &lsquo;encapsulated&rsquo; measurements (where a super-observer, with unrestricted ability to measure any arbitrary observable of a complex quantum system, measures the memory of an observer system after that system measures the spin of a qubit), I show that the Everett interpretation leads to modal contradictions. In this sense, the Everett interpretation is inconsistent.</p>1 aBub, Jeffrey  uhttps://arxiv.org/abs/1907.0624000504nam a2200109   4500008004100000245009500041210006900136260003100205100001700236700001500253856012600268       2018                        eng d00aTotally random: why nobody understands quantum mechanics (a serious comic on entanglement)0 aTotally random why nobody understands quantum mechanics a seriou  bPrinceton University Press1 aBub, Jeffrey1 aBub, Tanya  uhttps://www.quics.umd.edu/publications/totally-random-why-nobody-understands-quantum-mechanics-serious-comic-entanglement02123nas a2200121   4500008004100000245003900041210003900080260001500119520179200134100001701926700002101943856003701964       2007                        eng d00aTwo dogmas about quantum mechanics0 aTwo dogmas about quantum mechanics  c2007/12/273 a  We argue that the intractable part of the measurement problem -- the 'big'
measurement problem -- is a pseudo-problem that depends for its legitimacy on
the acceptance of two dogmas. The first dogma is John Bell's assertion that
measurement should never be introduced as a primitive process in a fundamental
mechanical theory like classical or quantum mechanics, but should always be
open to a complete analysis, in principle, of how the individual outcomes come
about dynamically. The second dogma is the view that the quantum state has an
ontological significance analogous to the significance of the classical state
as the 'truthmaker' for propositions about the occurrence and non-occurrence of
events, i.e., that the quantum state is a representation of physical reality.
We show how both dogmas can be rejected in a realist information-theoretic
interpretation of quantum mechanics as an alternative to the Everett
interpretation. The Everettian, too, regards the 'big' measurement problem as a
pseudo-problem, because the Everettian rejects the assumption that measurements
have definite outcomes, in the sense that one particular outcome, as opposed to
other possible outcomes, actually occurs in a quantum measurement process. By
contrast with the Everettians, we accept that measurements have definite
outcomes. By contrast with the Bohmians and the GRW 'collapse' theorists who
add structure to the theory and propose dynamical solutions to the 'big'
measurement problem, we take the problem to arise from the failure to see the
significance of Hilbert space as a new kinematic framework for the physics of
an indeterministic universe, in the sense that Hilbert space imposes kinematic
(i.e., pre-dynamic) objective probabilistic constraints on correlations between
events.
1 aBub, Jeffrey1 aPitowsky, Itamar  uhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0712.4258v2